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Gross domestic product today is
only modestly bigger than it was 100
years ago,1 at least if it’s measured in
tons! While this may seem an absurd
way to measure GDP, the point is that
how economic variables are measured
is important.
The last century has witnessed the arrival
of many new forms of durable goods:
aircraft, computers, lasers, robots, televi-
sion, microwave ovens, x-ray machines,
and cellular phones. It is obvious to any
layperson that technological progress is
embodied in new and improved capital
goods, yet economists have been unable
to discover any evidence that this is so.
Instead, they have found that nearly all
technological progress is disembodied,
that is, it affects the productivity of all in-
puts in production equally. Apparently it
makes no difference whether the inputs
are capital, labor, or land or, for that mat-
ter, whether the capital is new or old.
Nobel Prize winner Robert M. Solow
describes this laughable situation. “It is,”
he writes, “as if all technical progress
were something like time-and-motion
study, a way of improving the organiza-
tion and operation of inputs without ref-
erence to the nature of the inputs them-
selves. The striking assumption is that
old and new capital equipment partici-
pate equally in technical change. This
conflicts with the casual observation that
many if not most innovations need to 
be in new kinds of durable equipment be-
fore they can be made effective.”2
What has gone wrong with economic
measurement? The already-daunting
task of adding up all the goods and ser-
vices produced in an economy is further
complicated when new products appear,
old ones disappear, and the same ones
get better as technology advances. One
might be tempted to think that although
it puzzles economists, the measurement
question doesn’t much matter to anyone
else, but this turns out not to be so.
n n The Importance of the
Embodiment Question 
Ever since Adam Smith’s Inquiry into
the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of
Nations (1776), economists have tried to
identify the engines of growth; such
identification can be important for public
policy. For example, if technological
progress is largely embodied in the form
of new investment goods, then policies
that reduce the costs of acquiring new
equipment (such as investment tax credit
for buyers or R&D subsidies for produc-
ers) may stimulate growth.
The source of technological progress may
also have implications for issues such as
unemployment. In the U.S. economy, an
industry’s best plant can produce much
more output per hour of work than its
average plant can.3 Newer plants will
tend to have better technology because
they have newer capital, at least in a
world with investment-specific techno-
logical progress. Over time, older plants
and capital will tend to be displaced by
newer, more efficient ones. If a worker
must be trained to use technology that is
embodied in a capital good, that worker
becomes obsolete when the technology
does. In such a case, policies for retrain-
ing workers might be called for.4 So it
does matter whether technology is em-
bodied or disembodied because the
source of technological progress has im-
plications for economic growth, unem-
ployment, and other issues that society
cares about.
n n Measuring Technological
Progress
As Solow notes, the implementation of
technological progress is not free; it
requires investment in new equipment
and structures. This type of technologi-
cal progress may be called investment-
specific, since one must invest to realize
benefits from it. Then what share of eco-
nomic growth arises from investment-
specific technological progress in pro-
ducing new capital goods, both
equipment and structures, and what
share comes from disembodied techno-
logical progress?
Think about progress, and equipment
like computers or cars readily springs to
mind. One is much less likely to think
about structures, in which technological
progress is far less obvious though pre-
sent just the same. Take skyscrapers. The
Home Insurance Building in Chicago,
generally considered the world’s first,
was built in 1885 to a height of 10 sto-
ries. Compare this with Chicago’s Sears
Tower, completed in 1974 at 110 sto-
ries—a difference of 100 stories in less
than as many years. The increase in
height reflects significant advances in
engineering and design, as well as the
availability of new materials. The Sears
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ISSN 0428-1276Tower is 200 feet taller than the Empire
State Building (circa 1931), but it weighs
much less (223,000 tons versus 365,000).
The people who work in skyscrapers
must be kept comfortable, and this takes
space. For instance, the 29th floor of the
Sears Building is occupied by five air
chillers, three of them weighing 5,000
tons apiece. After being used in the
chillers, water is pumped up 77 floors to
four three-story-high cooling towers
(floors 106 through 109). The water, cas-
cading down the tower wall, is cooled by
enormous fans. Obviously, as technolog-
ical progress decreases the amount of
space necessary to provide the expected
level of comfort, the value of the build-
ing will increase, since more floor space
will be available for rental.
Technological progress in equipment
and structures has eased the burdens of
life for the average household, too. In
1956, not one home had a microwave
oven. Few had central heat and air or
even insulated walls and storm windows.
Only half of new homes had a garage.
Now, the vast majority come equipped
with these features as a matter of course
(see figure 1). 
So how much of economic growth is
fueled by investment-specific technolog-
ical advance in the production of new
capital goods, both equipment and struc-
tures, and how much derives from dis-
embodied technological advance? To






In the equipment-producing sector, the
pace of technological progress can be
tracked using the price of new producer
durables relative to the price of new con-
sumer nondurables. This shows how
many new units of equipment can be
bought in place of a forgone unit of con-
sumption. Over time, ever-increasing
quantities of new equipment can be pur-
chased for a forgone unit of consump-
tion. But what is a unit of equipment?
Consider the car, by no means a homo-
geneous product. Technological progress
made a 1995 automobile vastly different
from a 1965 model (figure 2). In 1965,
no new car had antilock brakes, power
locks, airbags, adjustable steering
columns, remote control, side-view mir-
rors, cruise control, or a windshield-
wiper delay. By 1995, most new cars had
these features.5
Think of a car as a bundle composed of
characteristics that customers want, just
as a chemical compound is built up from
a set of elements. When calculating the
price of a car, an economist must adjust
for the fact that the list of features in-
cluded in an average car is expanding
over time. That is, the same amount of
money (taking inflation into account)
spent on an automobile today may buy a
much better car than yesterday. There-
fore, the  price must be adjusted for qual-
ity improvements that have taken place
over time.
When prices are adjusted for quality
(figure 3), one can see a steady decline
in the relative price of new producer dur-
able goods since World War II. Again,
this represents the price of a unit of new
equipment in terms of the consumption
forgone to purchase it. Considered this
way, the prices of new producer durable
goods dropped at the rate of 3.2 percent
a year.6  Figure 3 also shows the
National Income and Product Account
measure, which only partially adjusts for
quality improvement. Observe that it fell
by much less.
To understand why, think about comput-
ers. An IBM mainframe cost $4,674,160
in 1970. Today a personal computer can
be bought for under $1,000. Cutting
prices by a factor of 4,674 is indeed tre-
mendous, but it is still likely to be a gross
underestimate! Suppose that a computer
had just one characteristic, the speed of
FIGURE 1 FEATURES OF NEW HOMES
SOURCE: Time Well Spent: The Declining Real Cost of Living in America. Federal Reserve Bank
of Dallas, 1997 Annual Report.
FIGURE 2 FEATURES OF NEW CARS
1. Power  steering; 2. Antilock brakes; 3. Power door locks; 4. Power seats; 5. Power windows;
6. Sun roof; 7. Air bags; 8. Windshield-wiper delay; 9. Tinted glass; 10. Air conditioning; 
11. Adjustable steering column; 12. Cruise control; 13. Remote-control sideview mirror.
SOURCE: Time Well Spent: The Declining Real Cost of Living in America. Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas, 1997 Annual Report.its calculations. The 1970 computer
could carry out 12.5 million instructions
per second (MIPS), while today’s PC can
do 166 MIPS. The price per MIPS, or for
a unit of a standardized computer, has
fallen meteorically (from $373,933 to
$6), so the number of MIPS that can be
purchased for $1 has increased by a fac-
tor of 62,322!7
Measuring Investment-Specific
Technological Progress in 
Structures
Quality-adjusted prices do not exist for
new structures, so the economist must
measure the rate of technological prog-
ress indirectly. If new buildings embody
technological progress, they should rent
for more than old ones. This turns out to
be true. Figure 4, which plots buildings’
rent as a function of age,8 is based on a
sample of rents collected from 200 office
buildings across the United States
between 1988 and 1996. Observe that
rents decline at a rate of about 1.5 percent
for each year that a building ages (rela-
tive to a new building). This curve is
called the rent gradient. By using an eco-
nomic model—a set of theoretical rela-
tionships spelling out the connections
between the demands for equipment and
structures, the rent gradient, and techno-
logical progress—the gradient can be
linked to an estimated underlying rate of
technological progress in structures. With
this approach, the underlying estimate
turns out to be 1 percent annually. That is,
each forgone unit of consumption can
purchase 1 percent more “standardized”
units of structures each year.
Measuring the Economy’s 
Capital Stock
Computing the value of the economy’s
stock of equipment and structures is a
formidable task. Conceptually, the capital
stock at a given point in time is the sum
of all previous purchases of capital that
are still in use. This raises two problems.
First, investment-specific technological
progress causes a dollar of investment
spending in 1999 to differ from a dollar
of investment spending in 1945. Hence,
spending on capital at different times
needs to be converted into standardized
units. Second, it is difficult to calculate
what portions of past investments are still
in use. Some investments will have been
abandoned, some will be operating at
less-than-full efficiency because of wear
and tear (this is called physical deprecia-
tion), and some may not be used because
they are economically obsolete, though
still capable of operating.
The National Income and Product Ac-
counts adjust only partially for the quality
improvement in investment over time, so
they underestimate growth in the econ-
omy’s capital stock. For example, they
calculate that over the postwar period, the
economy’s stock of equipment has grown
at an annual rate of 2.5 percent and its
stock of structures at 0.75 percent. Con-
trast these numbers to the estimates of 
4.4 percent and 2.2 percent that are based
on the 3.2 percent and 1 percent rates of
technological progress in equipment and
structures discussed earlier.
n n Accounting for Growth
How much of economic growth is due 
to investment-specific technological
progress? Economists often think of
GDP as being made from three factors of
production: equipment, structures, and
labor. Other things being equal, GDP
will increase whenever one of these fac-
tor inputs grows. The part of GDP
growth that cannot be explained by
growth in any of these inputs is disem-
bodied technological progress, which is
why Moses Abramovitz called it “a
measure of our ignorance.”
Now, factor inputs grow as a result of
technological progress, among other
things. The fact that equipment is more
productive over time is likely to imply
that businesses, governments, and house-
holds will demand more equipment. It
may imply that they will demand more
structures as well. The value of a building
increases when it can work with more
productive equipment. Likewise, the
value of equipment may rise when it is
housed in better structures. Therefore, the
economist must calculate how much of
the increase in the equipment stock arises
from technological progress in equipment
and how much arises from technological
progress in structures or other factors,
that is, from disembodied technological
progress. Again, this can be done with the
FIGURE 3 RELATIVE PRICE OF EQUIPMENT
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; and Robert J. Gordon,
The Measurement of Durable Goods Prices. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990. 
FIGURE 4 BUILDING AGE AND RENT
SOURCE: Michael Gort, Jeremy Greenwood, and Peter Rupert (see footnote 8).aid of an economic model. This means
breaking down GDP growth into growth
of factor inputs and then breaking down
factor input growth according to the vari-
ous sources of technological advance.
The results of doing all this suggest that
37 percent of economic growth results
from technological progress in equipment
and 15 percent from structures.9 In other
words, investment-specific technologi-
cal advance accounts for more than half
of economic growth. Evidently, Solow
was right.
n n Footnotes
1.  See Alan Greenspan’s remarks at the Eco-
nomic Conference of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston, June 1996. 
2.  See Robert M. Solow, “Investment and
Technological Progress,” in Kenneth Arrow,
Samuel Karlin, and Patrick Suppes, eds.,
Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences.
Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press,
1960, pp. 89–104. 
3.  W.E.G. Salter noted some time ago that the
best plant in the U.S. blast furnace industry
operated at twice the average productivity
level for the industry. Recent studies confirm
that there is a large gap in other industries as
well. See W.E.G. Salter, Productivity and
Technical Change. Cambridge, U.K.: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1966. 
4.  The key question for the policymaker is
whether workers should finance the costs of
such retraining themselves. 
5.  See Time Well Spent: The Declining 
Real Cost of Living in America. Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas, 1997 Annual
Report, exhibit 6. 
6.  Robert J. Gordon, The Measurement of
Durable Goods Prices. Chicago: The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1990. This number
probably underestimates the actual rate of
decline in the prices of new producer dur-
able goods, largely because the series did 
not adjust all producer durable prices for
quality improvements.
7.  Time Well Spent: The Declining Real Cost
of Living in America, p. 19. 
8.  The data reported from here to the end of
this Commentary are from Michael Gort,
Jeremy Greenwood, and Peter Rupert, “Mea-
suring the Rate of Technological Progress in
Structures,” Review of Economic Dynamics,
vol. 2, no. 1 (January 1999), pp. 207–30.
9.  Disembodied technological progress
accounts for the remaining 48 percent of eco-
nomic growth.
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